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is incorporated by reference. Hence, the trustee's powers are limited
to those which the state allows a supposed creditor of the bankrupt,
who at the date of bankruptcy completed the process for perfection
of a lien. In re Wright Industries,93 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Ohio E.D.,
1950). Although the extent of the trustee's rights, remedies, and
powers are measured by state law, it nonetheless remains that the
determination of the trustee's right to such a status is dependent
on the Bankruptcy Act. It is the federal law which controls this
aspect of the problem. Valid liens may be created by state legislation, but the state may not limit the duration of such liens by
the time of bankruptcy, or extend their duration beyond that time
upon any conceivable theory. Commercial Credit v. Davidson, 112
F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1940). Furthermore, both the powers of the
trustee and the rights of creditors are determined as of the date
of bankruptcy and remain fixed thereafter, regardless of state law.
Lockhart v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co., 116 F.2d 658 (2d Cir.
1940).
From the foregoing authorities the conclusion is obvious that
§ 70(c) gives the trustee in bankruptcy all rights, remedies, and
powers of an actual creditor granted to him in respect to § 70(e)
plus all those of the hypothetical creditor under § 70(c).
'he principal case has certainly curtailed, if not destroyed, the
effect of these sections. For it cannot be denied that an actual
creditor could have proceeded in the state court any time before
the bankruptcy petition was filed and could have avoided the mortgage because by state law it was until this time void as to him. His
rights as a "flesh and blood" creditor should pass to the trustee in
bankruptcy. Since § 70(c) does not require an actual creditor this
right should logically extend to the trustee under the facts in this
case. However, such was not the holding. The ultimate result here
is to confer upon the state not only the power to determine just
what rights, remedies, and powers the trustees in bankruptcy has,
but to determine whether the trustee is entitled to the status of a
creditor created by state law. Past decisions indicate that this is
not the law.
R. M. H.
CONsTTUTONAL LAw-COURT-MATIAL-JURISDIMcON OVER CI-

vnIAnw DEPENDENTS AND EMPLoYEEs.-The United States Supreme
Court on January 18, 1960, decided four cases involving the constitutional validity of court-martial trials of civilian personnel
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employed by or accompanying the armed forces outside the United
States in time af peace. The four cases involve three situations:
'(1) No. 22, a civilian dependent tried for a noncapital offense; (2)
Nos. 21 and 37, civilian employees of the military tried for noncapital offenses; and (3) No. 58, a civilian employee of the military
tried for a capital offense. Held, that the provision of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice Art. 2(11), 10 U.S.C.A. § 802 (11), was
unconstitutional as applied to such persons during peace time regardless of the crime, since it deprived them of certain constitutional
rights. No. 58, Grisham v. Hagan, 80 Sup.Ct 310 (1960); No. 22,
Kinsella v. Singleton, 80 Sup. Ct. 297 (1960); No. 21, McElroy v.
Guagliardo,80 Sup. Ct. 305 (1960); No. 37, Wilson v. Bohlender,
80 Sup. Ct. 305 (1960).
The Constitution art. 1, § 8 c. 14 empowers Congress to regulate the armed forces and clause 18 authorizes Congress to make
all laws necessary in implementing the foregoing powers. Under
such authorization, the aforementioned provision of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice was enacted subjecting persons serving
with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside of
the United States to court-martial trials. The question involved in
all these cases is whether this provision is constitutional since it
apparently contravenes certain other constitutional provisions guaranteeing indictment by a grand jury and trial by jury. U. S. CoNST.
amends. V and VI.
On June 11, 1956, the United States Supreme Court upheld
military court convictions of civilian dependents for capital offenses.
Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U. S. 470 (1955), and Reid v. Covert, 851
U. S. 487 (1955). However, on June 10, 1957, these decisions were
reversed and Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
was declared unconstitutional when applied in the trial of capital
cases of civilian dependents accompanying members of the armed
forces overseas in time of peace. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
The majority opinions in the principal cases relied heavily upon
the final Reid decision, supra, in determining whether court-martial
trials of civilian dependents and employees for non-capital offenses
were constitutional.
The government contended that art. 1, § 8, el. 18 of the Constitution was sufficient to allow the expansion of art. 1, § 8, cl. 14
to include civilian dependents and employees overseas during peacetime. It was argued that such expansion was essential to secure
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discipline among such persons. The court held that clause 14
could not be so expanded by clause 18 to include prosecution of
such civilians for noncapital offenses since it had previously decided
that clause 14 could not be expanded to include prosecution of
capital offenses committed by such civilians. Reid v. Covert, 854
U.S. 1 (1956). The court refused to recognize a constitutional distinction between capital and noncapital offenses, holding that the
question of military jurisdiction was determined by the "status" of
the accused, rather than by the nature of the offense.
In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 850 U.S. 11 (1955),
it was decided that a discharged soldier could not be tried by
court-martial, after his discharge, for an offense committed before his discharge. In this case the court held that the jurisdiction of military tribunals should be restricted very narrowly and
allowed only where it was deemed absolutely essential to maintenance of discipline among troops in active service. The court
further held that the consideration of discipline was no reason to
expand the jurisdiction of courts-martial. Needless to say the
majority opinion in the principal cases relied strongly on the Toth
case.
Mr. Justice Harlan wrote dissenting opinions as to Nos. 22, 21,
and 37, and concurred in No. 58, the case involving a civilian
employee tried for a capital offense. Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined
with him. They considered the Reid case correct, but felt that it
should be limited to capital offenses. They refused to accept "status"
as the sole determining factor of jurisdiction in military courts, and
expressed the view that the real test should be the proximity of the
relationship between the person affected and the military establishment. They took the position that there was a sufficiently close
relationship between civilian dependents and employees to bring
such persons within the jurisdiction of courts-martial for noncapital
offenses during peace time, though not for capital offenses. They
reasoned that due to the finality of capital cases, nonmilitary personnel overseas should not be tried by courts-martial. The Supreme
Court has recognized the important difference between such offenses
by requiring a state, under the 14th amendment, to appoint counsel
for an indigent defendant in a capital case, Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1982), but not in all noncapital cases. Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942). Mr. Justice Whittaker, with whom Mr. Justice
Stewart joined, concurred in part and dissented in part. They distinguished between civilian dependents and civilian employees.
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They reasoned that the civilian dependents should not be tried by
a court-martial for either capital or noncapital offenses, but that
civilian employees could be tried in such courts for all offenses.
They pointed out historically that as early as the American Revolution the "Articles of War" adopted by the Continental Congress
provided for trials by courts-martial of nonmilitary personnel serving
with the army. WINT-moPE, M ArrYa LAW AND PxcEDEN'rs 961
(1920). They believed that the framers of the Constitution must
have had these articles in mind when, in Art. 1, § 8, cl. 14, they
authorized Congress to regulate the land and naval forces and
intended the provision to include civilian employees.
Now let us examine the effect these decisions will have upon
civilian dependents and employees overseas. An American citizen
in a foreign country is not guaranteed any constitutional rights as
against a foreign sovereign. Such persons are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the foreign sovereign. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Under the various statusof-forces agreements, the military authorities are only given jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law. N.A.T.O. Status
of Forces Agreement art. VII, para. 1(a) (1951). As a result of
the principal cases, the Supreme Court has held that civilian dependents and employees are not subject to military law for any
offenses. Therefore, such persons do not fall within the status-offorces agreements leaving only the foreign governments as competent authorities to exercise jurisdiction over them.
This presents a real dilemma. Has the court actually accomplished a just and desired end? The trials in the principal cases
were held to the unconstitutional because they deprived the defendants of certain constitutional rights, such as a trial by jury, but
by these decisions such defendants are now placed greatly at the
mercy of the foreign sovereign and may be completely deprived
of any guarantee of any constitutional rights, not simply a loss of
some constitutional rights. Would it not be more advantageous
to United States citizens overseas to be tried by fellow citizens
under a judicial system based upon the principles of American
jurisprudence than by a foreign court whose ideas of justice and
punishment might be completely intolerable to Americans?
Possible solutions to this problem may be found in the alteration
of treaties and agreements so that the United States might retain
jurisdiction of such citizens or such countries might be willing to
waive their jurisdiction, as the United States did in the case of
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Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). But this does not completely solve the problem, because immediately, in transferring all
such cases to the United States for trial, additional problems such
as cost, delay and difficulty in obtaining witnesses arise.
It thus appears that, while the Supreme Court was endeavoring
to solve one problem, some other problems posing far greater difllcultie2s have arisen. What is to be the fate of the offenders in the
principal cases and like offenders in the future? Are they to be tried
by the foreign countries in which the crimes were committed? Or
will the government attempt to have these countries waive their
jurisdiction so that the trials may be had in civilian courts in the
United States? Or will the accused persons be set free without
any trials?
Is it not possible that the employment and application of the
principles of the principal cases may in the years ahead result in
roadblocks to justice because of the running of statutes of limitation, -the death or disappearance of witnesses, prohibitive costs,
discouraging delays and other impediments to orderly and effective
judicial administration?
A. M. P.

CoNsTrrutIoNAL

LAw-DUE

PRocEss-EvmEccE

REQUImED To

SusTAIN CUMmAL CONVlCrION.-P was a longtime resident of the
Louisville, Kentucky, area and a frequent patron at a cafe in that
city. He entered the cafe one evening to enjoy the facilities thereof
while waiting for a bus. Two policemen, on a "routine check,"
inquired of the cafe manager as to how long P had been there and
whether he had bought anything. The manager replied that he
persornally had not served anything to P (P's testimony was that
one of the employees serving him a dish of macaroni and a glass of
beer). The officer accosted P and "asked him what was his reason
for being in there and he said he was waiting on a bus." The officer
then informed P he was under arrest and took him outside. P asked
why he was being arrested (the officer testified that P was argumentative). P had a record of 54 previous arrests. The Police
Court of Louisville found P guilty of two offenses-loitering and
disorderly conduct-and fined him $10.00 on each charge. Upon
examination of P's petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court of the
United States found that, although the fines were small, due process
questions were substantial and granted certiorari. Held, complete
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